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In mid-2010, France will open market competition to online gambling and casinos. 
The market is opening as European law evolves and reacts to the growing number 
of  illegal  Internet  sites.  The  ensuing  new  legal  scope  targets  quality-based 
competition  versus  price-oriented  competition,  especially  to  contain  addictive 
behaviours,  and  more  specifically,  money  laundering.  Concomitantly,  the  game 
market  is  creating  new  value  chains,  including  media  and  telecommunications 
groups. In the short term, the historic players (Française des Jeux and PMU) are 
key players in the new landscape, with the long-term horizon pointing to major 
changes.  
Opening to competition a singular market 
By  the  summer  of  2010,  French  legislation  will  have  defined  the  guidelines  to  open 
competition for  online  games  and  betting. This  is not the  end  of  “just  another” public 
monopoly. As underlined in the bill, “betting and games are neither an everyday business, 
nor everyday service”, falling under the aegis of “public law and order, public security and 
health protection”
 [1].  
Legislative kickoff dates back to 2003, when the CJCE (Court of Justice of the European 
Communities) believed that Italy had violated the principle of free circulation of services by 
prohibiting  online  bookmaking  (the  Gambelli  decision).  In  2006,  the  European 
Commissioner of the Internal Market and Services warned France (as well as Austria and 
Italy) that the sports betting market should be opened. Negotiation and fine-tuning will 
have taken four years (defining the scope of games involved, tax laws, etc.,) to adopt a law 
accounting for the following specificities: 
· The market is only partially opening to competition, covering online horse-race betting, sports 
bets and poker. The law does not cover offline bets and games, lotteries or scratch cards 
(which remain under the aegis of the Française des Jeux-FdJ), and casino-based games 
other than poker (namely slot machines).  
· New entry players will receive a license, renewable for a five-year period, from the ARJEL 
(Regulatory Authority on Online Games, a recently created instance to this end). A licensed 
player of a European Union country will not automatically be accredited in France (French 
nationals playing on a non-French accredited site will be deemed as engaging in illegal 
play). In the same token, a French casino license holder is not automatically accredited for 
online gaming.  
· The payout rate, or players’ gains are limited to 80% -85%. Illegal sites currently post rates 
topping 90% (as do slot machines in casinos), while legally accredited sites (FdJ and PMU 
who have the monopoly) offer payout rates between 50% and 75%.  
· Taxes will be about 2% for poker, 8.5% for sports bets, and 15.5 % for horse-racing bets, with 
the amount of the bet serving as the basis for tax versus the payout.    Figure 1: Scope of gambling and betting games open to competition,  
 “Technology” is more likely the force pushing the opening, rather than the “European 
pressure”.  
Recently created instances, such as ARJEL and HADOPI, could pursue the same objective: 
setting up coherent regulatory instances to police traditional lines of business upset by the 
Internet and other electronic communication networks (namely the mobile phone).  
In France, the forces prying these markets open are linked to the Internet rather than 
European  injunctions.  Proof  lies  in  the  number  of  Google’s  online  gambling  links. 
Excluding the FdJ and PMU sites, most sites are illegal (try playing from a French IP 
address). The online player is on the threshold of scrub comprising myriads of sites offering 
various quality levels and guarantees (namely those based in or outside the EU), to which 
the player is more often than not oblivious. By definition, revenues for an online game are 
difficult to estimate, but the FdJ underlines a 3 G€ figure representing an illegal online bet 
from a French-based site FdJ
[2].  
Current regulatory problems are not in line with public targets (especially in terms of 
controlling addictions). Technological evolutions are already pushing problems to the fore. 
Applied to online games this phenomenon epitomizes the classical technological transition. 
Anchored in fundamental and irreversible evolutions, new technologies seek to reduce costs 
and vary the game offer (namely by having players interact more with one another in poker 
games), more households now have the technology to play (computers, mobile phones …), 
and  users  are  more  proficient  in  using  their  mobile  phones.  Given  this  context,  the 
regulatory monopoly status is not a pass/safety net for tomorrow, since the ensuing rent 
creates an economic area for new competitors (the payout rate for the FdJ and the PMU is 
low compared to the scrub sites).  
  
One of the legal objectives is to instill quality-based competition rather than price-based 
competition.  
Since  it  will  be  impossible  to  entirely  prohibit  illegal  sites
[3],  the  law  pushes  licensed 
players to use quality-based critieria as marketing rationale. This orientation stems from 
legal  obligations  (transparency,  containing  fraud  and  money  laundering,  reducing 
excessive gaming, etc.,). But just as fundamentally licensees will not be as competitive on a 
price-basis compared to the illegal sites which are exempt from paying all types of taxes, or 
(most often) have no external pressure (as they are hosted in European zones which have 
low tax rates). Generally speaking, legal sites offer a payout rate which is at minimum less 
than 10% and based solely on price, legal sites would lose this war.  
The strategy, therefore, lies in building a brand to make players confident: sponsoring 
deals with sports’ companies or with specific media could be key to implement this strategy.  
Enhanced quality was perceived even before the law passed. In October 2008, the Nantes 
University Medical School inaugurated the first center of addiction for betting and games, 
partnering with the FdJ and PMU. Why didn’t the incumbents take this type of action 
earlier? Today, in light of the new market competition, their action appears as a means to 
further anchor the public’s perception of the FdJ and the PMU as responsible players.  
This dimension is key since French authorities believe that online players will pay a 10% 
premium  (linked  to  the  more  modest  payout  of  licensed  French  players)  for  State 
certification, respect of specifications requested by licensees and the efforts sites make to provide quality services. 
The French are not compulsive players.  
As a game-playing nation, France is averagely intense: households dedicate 0.9% of their 
budgets, which is below the EU average, and lags behind countries like Finland (1.9%) or 
Spain (2%) and even the United Kingdom (1.2%)
[4]. Although there is no average national 
figure, the French do not seem to be compulsive players (in line with the Germans at 0.8%).  
The  current  situation  stems  from  sustained  long  term  growth.  In  the  beginning  of  the 
1980’s, game playing raised an average 3% a year, exceeding average household growth 
(2%) (INSEE). Growth is linked to two key innovations. First, the creation of a National 
Lottery in 1976, and ensuing offshoots, include the Euro Million. Second, as of 1988, the 
progressive authorization of slot machines in casinos. Further, both the FdJ and the PMU 
have innovated: the FdJ launched new types of scratch cards or sports lotteries, while the 
PMU has diversified types of wagers.  
In 2008, wagers totaled 37 billion euros (50% for casinos and 25% for FdJ and PMU), 
bringing in 8.2 billion euros in gross revenues (2.5 billion euros for casinos, 3.5 billion 
euros for the FdJ and 2.5 billion euros for the PMU).  
A number of factors, however, show that the industry is losing wind, with no growth relays 
in sight. Since 2003, wager growth has grown less than spending on leisure, and according 
to  INSEE  is  even  stagnating  under  10%  (and  has  not  been  impacted  by  the  economic 
crisis).  
Until now France’s traditional offline game offer has met players’ expectations, but the 
under-30 set will be more tempted by an online version, via a computer or mobile phone. It 
is also probable that the frontier between video games and gambling will become fuzzier.  
So, redefining the rules for online gaming also means anticipating tomorrow’s gameplay. 
Today’s Internet offer may not suffice demand, and new Internet-based services may lead to 
higher household outlays, especially since the French market shows room for growth, and 
market competition will not lead to mere cannibalization (for either online or offline game 
offers).  
Looking forward to the medium term, the incumbents have the required assets to keep the 
ball in the market’s new segments. Indeed, market competition will not impact the offline 
core businesses of the FdJ or PMU, since the current sociological structure of their client 
base is mainly offline. More, since this client base is neither attracted by the Internet nor by 
mail-order, they are not likely to turn to online games when competition opens. Finally, 
popular games like lottery drawings are not included in the proposed law, so new market 
players will not be able to offer lottery games
[5].  
Another key advantage for the incumbents is that their offers have been online for a number 
of years (reaping high-level wagers, totalling 5% of all bets placed with the FdJ and PMU). 
Both market players already have the required economic assets to develop an online offer 
which meets the legal scope in the new market competition. The PMU’s ambition is to move 
outside of its current field to sports bets (especially in light of the World Soccer Cup), while 
the FdJ is seeking to move into poker (via a partnership with the Barrière casino group).  
The situation is trickier for casinos, since the industry is already highly comepetitive and 
casinos can not provide the online offers that the FdJ and PMU provide. More, online 
poker is biting into the cake that casinos were eyeing to offset the erosion of their slot 
machines.   Towards the redefinition the value chain.  
While the first part of this brief focused on the retail market, the law has spawned an 
industrial reorganization. Technically speaking, analyzing the value chain underlines the 
differences between the physical network as a monopoly profiting the physical distribution 
network and the virtual network which includes:  
· Developers of landline and mobile handsets involved in the design and production of TV sets, 
set top boxes, mobile phones, TV over IP and game consoles.  
· Telecommunication operators, as they are a prerequisite to transfer content and games to a 
terminal.  
· The platform’s service offer enhances as software developers further the interface.  
  Figure 2: Value chain of physical and virtual networks,  
 Conclusion 
  
The CJCE’s September 2009 decision, pitting the Portuguese soccer league and online 
game company Bwin opposite the Portuguese national lottery, Santa Casa (the decision 
upheld the national lottery’s decision), confirms that heterogeneity will continue to reign as 
the European Union reorganizes the game industry.  
Given this backdrop, the reorganization of the French market as it opens to competition is 
the  accomplishment  of  complex  arbitrage...and  will  likely  be  difficult  to  implement. 
Organizing fair competition among market players with different interests and business 
scopes will be pivotal.  
Another bone of contention will be how to allocate costs for the same concern, given that 
part of its business is run as a monopoly and another part is run as a competitive business. 
More, the legal climate is unstable.  
This reorganization also brings to light possible partnerships, between telecommunications 
operators and the media in the gaming arena. For both parties the appeal is strong. First, 
because of the wagers. Second, because game content drives traffic over networks and thus 
brings audiences (the number of shows dedicated to poker is proof enough).  
It is key to underline the platform’s strategic position, since it does not appear in the value 
chain of a physical game, yet it is the crux of the online game. Bet aggregators and client 
accounts are key players, as they link to various online poker sites, pushing the concentric 
rings farther out, and bring in bets and potential payouts (thereby underpinning network 
externalities).  
Aggregators  are  dividing  up  the  pie:  some  are  focusing  on  the  wholesale  business 
(Playtech,  Ongame),  while  others  do  both  retail  and  wholesale  business  (888).  These 
aggregators are the game’s backbone and are well-positioned to reap the market’s most 
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